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The Long and Winding Road:
Case Comment on Mikisew Cree First
Nation v. Canada (Minister of
Canadian Heritage)
1

Bryan P. Schwartz and Darla L. Rettie*

I. OVERVIEW
In Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian
Heritage), the Court addressed the tension in the numbered treaties
between the right of First Nations to hunt and fish as before and the
authority of governments to “take up” land for settlement and other
purposes. The Court decided that the Crown must engage in a
meaningful process of consultation and accommodation when a
contemplated “taking up” may have an adverse effect on the exercise of
a First Nation’s treaty rights. These duties apply regardless of whether
the “taking up” is so substantial as to amount to a prima facie
infringement of a treaty right.2
This framework for consultation adopted by the Court was the one
adopted in two recent cases involving the rights of First Nations that had
not yet been proved: Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of
Forests)3 and Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia
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1
[2005] S.C.J. No. 71, 2005 SCC 69 [hereinafter “Mikisew v. Canada”].
2
The decision in Mikisew v. Canada clarifies that the proper analytical path is not to jump
into the Sparrow rights infringement analysis without first determining whether procedural process
requirements have been met, see para. 59.
3
[2004] S.C.J. No. 70, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [hereinafter “Haida”].
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(Project Assessment Director).4 The Supreme Court held in these cases
that the Crown’s obligation to consult flows from the honour of the
Crown.
It remains to be explored in future cases whether the Haida
framework is significantly different than that used for addressing cases
of outright substantive infringement of rights — first outlined in R. v.
Sparrow, and subsequently refined in R. v. Badger.5 Both the Haida and
Sparrow frameworks are flexible. The scope of the Crown’s obligations
to consult and accommodate, in both situations, will depend on such
factors as the seriousness of the adverse effect on the exercise of rights
(or claimed rights). The application of the Haida framework in a
particular situation may be sufficient to establish that Crown action is
unlawful, and thereby make the application of the Sparrow test moot.6
The judgment of the Supreme Court in Mikisew v. Canada invites at
least two questions:
•

Why did the Court choose to adopt a preliminary process analysis
instead of directly applying the Sparrow infringement test, as it had
done in Badger, where another treaty right (to hunt, fish and trap)
was in tension with a Crown authority recognized in the treaty?

•

Why did the Court not define with some precision what level of
interference with the exercise of a treaty right amounts to an
infringement that triggers the application of the Sparrow test?

II. BACKGROUND
The case of Mikisew v. Canada is essentially about a proposed and
approved 118-kilometre winter road, designed to track alongside the
Mikisew Cree First Nation Peace Point Reserve. The journey to achieve
recognition that it was entitled to direct consultation on the proposed
road took the Mikisew Cree First Nation (“Mikisew”) six years, and
three court proceedings.7 In the end, the Minister’s road approval order
4

[2004] S.C.J. No. 69, 2004 SCC 74 [hereinafter “Taku”].
[1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 [hereinafter “Sparrow”]; [1996] S.C.J. No.
39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 [hereinafter “Badger”].
6
Mikisew v. Canada, supra, note 1, para. 57.
7
Mikisew Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage), [2001] F.C.J.
No. 1877 (T.D.) [hereinafter “Mikisew, Trial Division”], [2004] F.C.J. No. 277 (C.A.) [hereinafter
“Mikisew, Court of Appeal”], reversing Federal Court decision.
5

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)
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was quashed on the basis that the Crown had failed to engage in a direct
and meaningful consultation process, prior to authorizing construction.
The Mikisew are signatories to Treaty No. 8, under which they
surrendered 840,000 sq km of land to Crown, in exchange for reserve
land, and the right to hunt, fish and trap on the surrendered land. Rights
explicated in Treaty No. 8 are subject to a number of internal limitations
— including the Crown’s right to “take up” land for settlement, trading,
resources, or similar purposes:
And Her Majesty the Queen hereby agrees with the said Indians that
they shall have right to pursue their usual vocations of hunting,
trapping and fishing throughout the tract surrendered as before
described, subject to such regulations as may from time to time be
made by the Government of the country, acting under the authority of
Her Majesty, and saving and excepting such tracts as may be required
or taken up from time to time for settlement, mining, lumbering,
trading or other purposes. [Emphasis added.] (Report of
Commissioners for Treaty No. 8 (1899), at p.12)8

Initially, the Minister of Canadian Heritage approved a routing of
the winter road that ran directly through Mikisew Cree First Nation
Peace Point Reserve, which is wholly contained within Wood Buffalo
National Park. The park itself is entirely within the area covered by
Treaty No. 8.9 The decision was made absent any direct consultation
with the Mikisew. Instead, the government held open houses, inviting
public comment.
After the Mikisew protested, the road alignment was changed to
track around the reserve rather than through it, although it was still
within the traditional territories of the Mikisew. Again, this decision was
reached without direct consultation with the affected First Nation, nor
did the evidence establish that any consideration was given to whether
the new route would minimize impacts on the Mikisew’s treaty rights.10
The Minister ultimately approved a 200-metre wide, 23 square
kilometre road corridor in which use of firearms would be prohibited.11

8

As cited in Mikisew v. Canada, supra, note 1, para. 2.
See Mikisew, Trial Division, supra, note 7, para. 7-8; Dominion Forest Reserves and
Parks Act, S.C. 1911, c. 10, as amended.
10
Mikisew v. Canada, supra, note 1, para. 20.
11
Under s. 36(5) of the Wood Buffalo National Park Regulations, SOR/78-830, the road
would require a 200-metre corridor in which the use of firearms would be prohibited.
9
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Although the communities within the park itself are rather small, the
residents in those communities participate in traditional hunting and
trapping. The proposed route ran through registered trapping areas and
moose hunting grounds. At trial, Hansen J. found that approximately 14
Mikisew families who trap and 100 Mikisew hunters would be
adversely affected by the road, which the Court found to be a significant
number, within the context of remote northern communities of relatively
few families.12
At trial, Hansen J. applied the infringement test outlined in Sparrow,
and found public notices were not sufficient as the Mikisew were
entitled to direct consultation. The infringement was not justified, and
the order was quashed.
The majority of the Court of Appeal reversed on argument that
Treaty No. 8 expressly contemplated the “taking up” of surrendered
lands for various purposes — including roads — and that such a “taking
up” was a proper exercise of the Crown’s right under the treaty rather
than a treaty infringement.
The majority judgment held that:
…with the exceptions of cases where the Crown has taken up land in
bad faith or has taken up so much land that no meaningful right to hunt
remains, taking up land for a purpose express or necessarily implied in
the treaty itself cannot be considered an infringement of the treaty
right to hunt.13

The test of “no meaningful right to hunt” was invented for the
occasion by the majority in the Court of Appeal. On this basis, the
majority of the Court of Appeal found no obligation to consult, and the
Sparrow test was not considered. It should be noted that the decision
was delivered before the release of the Supreme Court’s decisions in
Haida and Taku.
The Supreme Court agreed with the trial judge that the proposed
corridor would affect the Mikisew’s ability to exercise their right to hunt
and trap. The Crown’s suggestion that the test should be whether the
Mikisew were able to practically exercise their right within the province
“as a whole” was rejected as untenable, as was the Attorney General’s
suggestion that the infringement of 23 sq km was de minimus.14

12
13
14

Mikisew v. Canada, supra, note 1, para. 3.
Mikisew, Court of Appeal, supra, note 7, para. 18.
Mikisew v. Canada, supra, note 1, paras. 45, 47.
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The Court held the Crown had not discharged its procedural duty to
engage directly with the applicant in consultation, or to minimize the
adverse impacts of the winter road on its hunting, fishing, and trapping
rights. On this basis, the case was sent back to the Crown for further
consultation and consideration.

III. REALIGNMENT OF COURT ANALYSIS IN TREATY MATTERS
1. Starting Point in Analysis — Have Process Rights Been
Observed?
Although Treaty No. 8 clearly contemplates a number of limitations on
the right to hunt/fish/trap — i.e., when lands are “taken up” — the
historical context of Treaty No. 8, and the tensions underlying treaty
interpretation, require the Crown to engage in a process when it seeks to
“take up” land that is currently available for treaty guaranteed purposes.
A transfer process without consultation, the Court concludes, would not
adequately respect the treaty rights of First Nations to hunt, fish and
trap.15 On this basis, the Court held the Mikisew had a right to
consultation and accommodation at a preliminary stage of project
consideration, the content of which turned on the degree to which their
treaty rights would be affected by the proposed road.
In reaching its conclusion, the Court rejects the position of the
majority of the Court of Appeal: that a treaty right to “take up” land is a
right to take unilateral action, save for the instances where it can be
shown that no meaningful amount of land remains or that the Crown has
acted in bad faith.16 The Court found this position untenable, as it would
ignore situations where such action would significantly and adversely
affect Aboriginal interests.
With its decision in Mikisew v. Canada, the Court built on similar
holdings in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia,17 Sparrow, Badger, Haida
and Taku, when it stated that the Crown’s procedural duty to consult is
grounded in the honour of the Crown — which is a distinct source of
obligation that exists independent of the text of any specific treaty. As
such, the honour of the Crown may be invoked as a central principle in

15
16
17

Id., para. 54.
Id., para. 48.
[1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”].
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resolving Aboriginal claims to consultation.18 In the instant case, the
Court stated:
[T]he honour of the Crown infuses every treaty and the performance
of every treaty obligation. Treaty 8 therefore gives rise to Mikisew
procedural rights (e.g. consultation) as well as substantive rights (e.g.
hunting, fishing and trapping rights). Were the Crown to have
barrelled ahead with implementation of the winter road without
adequate consultation, it would have been in violation of its
procedural obligations, quite apart from whether or not the Mikisew
could have established that the winter road breached the Crown’s
substantive treaty obligations as well.

The threshold test for triggering a procedural duty to consult is low;
the Court will imply some consultation obligations when Crown
conduct “might adversely affect” a treaty right.19 What is variable is the
content of the Crown’s duty to engage in a consultation/accommodation
process. Once engaged, the scope of required consultation, within the
treaty context, is predicated on a number of factors including:
•

the clarity of promises made under the treaty;

•

the seriousness of impact of proposed Crown actions;

•

the history of dealings between the Crown and the particular First
Nation; and

•

whether the treaty provides a framework to manage foreseen
changes in land use.20

Based on the strength of the listed factors, the Crown’s obligations
will fall somewhere within the consultation spectrum, first outlined in
Delgamuukw. In the instant case, the Crown’s procedural duty to consult
was found to be at the lower end of the spectrum.
In Mikisew v. Canada, the Court makes explicit reference to what
adequate low level consultation would involve: giving notice, offering

18

See Mikisew v. Canada, supra, note 1, paras. 51, 57. The failure of the Crown to engage
in a process of direct consultation offends two core treaty interpretation principles:
• it undermined the fundamental objective of modern treaty right analysis —
reconciliation of competing Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal claims; and
• it undermined the Crown’s obligation to act honourably in its dealings with First
Nations.
19
Mikisew v. Canada, supra, note 1, para. 57 (emphasis in original).
20
Id., para. 63.
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direct engagement, providing information addressing relevant concerns
and potential adverse effects, soliciting feedback, and attempting to
minimize adverse impacts.21
Although the Court takes pains to state that the consultation process
would not have given the Mikisew a veto over the road alignment, the
content of the right is expressly more substantial than low-end
consultation rights identified in Haida, which merely required the
Crown to give notice, disclose information, and discuss issues raised in
response to the notice,22 or in Delgamuukw, where at the low end of the
spectrum, the Court identified that the duty to consult may be no more
than the obligation to discuss important decisions that will be taken,
with respect to lands held under Aboriginal title.23
The more exacting the obligations, the less flexibility the
government may ultimately have when designing consultation policies
or regulatory mechanisms that will meet the minimums stated within
relevant decided cases.
2. Possible Reasons for the Analytical Shift
The recognition of a duty to consult in the context of “taking up” cases,
in Mikisew v. Canada, adds to the scope of obligations to consult and
accommodate flowing from the “honour of the Crown”. The Sparrow
framework applies to actual infringements of Aboriginal and treaty
rights, rights under the Natural Resources Transfer Agreements, and to
the regulation of hunting and fishing rights under the numbered treaties.
The Haida framework applies to claimed but as yet unproved rights and
to contemplated “takings up” of land under the numbered treaties. The
Court’s recognition of the last-mentioned duty clearly flowed in part
from its view that a failure to do so in cases like Mikisew v. Canada
would amount to a high-handedness in dealing with constitutionally
protected rights.
The question that naturally arises, however, is why the Court chose
to invoke the Haida rather than the Sparrow framework in the context of
“takings up”, in contrast to its earlier approach to another treaty pairing

21
22
23

Id., para. 64.
Haida, supra, note 3, paras. 43-45.
Delgamuukw, supra, note 17, para. 168.
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(rights to hunt and fish, subject to the Crown’s right to regulate) in
Badger.24
We speculate that the Court may have chosen to engage in a Haida
framework analysis for a number of reasons:
1. The Sparrow framework explicitly says compensation may be a
factor in some cases.
2. The Court may have tried to steer clear of any need to consider
compensation on the basis of its belief that this matter is best dealt
with initially as part of the negotiation process between parties. At
the trial level, Hansen J. chose not to consider the adequacy of the
ex gratia payments that had been offered by the Crown, in light of
her finding on the inadequacy of the consultation.25
3. There may have been some reluctance to deal with compensation, as
the Court might have been concerned about whether this might
amount to the Crown paying for the same thing (the right to take up
land for settlement) twice — initially, when the treaty was signed,
and then later on in the context of an actual development.
In reality, two stages of compensation — one at the time of the
treaty, another in the context of an actual taking up of land — might
actually be entirely appropriate in some cases. The treaty right
might be viewed as generally authorizing the Crown to share the
land, with additional compensation acquired only if and when
Crown use of the land has a significant adverse effect. While
wrestling with the issue of compensation may have been one reason
for the Court to steer clear of the Sparrow test, it is not by any
means clear that the same issue will not arise in the context of the
Haida framework. In some cases, a First Nation might successfully
argue that compensation — which might be in the form of revenue
sharing from a development — is part of the necessary
accommodation.

24
Interveners, including the Assembly of First Nations, argued that the Crown’s right to
“take up” land should be exercised in accordance with the Sparrow test, because like in Badger,
this case involved both a right and a qualification of that right. The consistent and logical approach,
it was argued, would be to treat all right/qualification couplings in a consistent manner, whether
that qualification is the right of the Crown to pass regulations, take up land, or expropriate.
25
Mikisew, Trial Division, supra, note 7, para. 78.
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4. The Court may be adopting a more cautious approach to the
recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights in the aftermath of the
political backlash against its decision in R. v. Marshall.26 The Court
may have been concerned about the consequences of finding, as the
British Columbia Court of Appeal held in Halfway River First
Nation v. British Columbia (Ministry of Forests),27 that every
“taking up of land for settlement” should be viewed as tantamount
to an infringement of a treaty right. It may have been concerned that
such an approach would lead in some subsequent cases to judicial
decisions that would unduly (from the perspective of the Court)
impair the ability of provincial governments to manage and develop
Crown lands.
5. The negotiating record of Treaty No. 8 includes statements by the
Crown that could be construed as promising that the taking up of
land would not have a significant impact on the exercise of treaty
rights. At the time of the treaty, even the Crown did not expect a
large influx of settlers into the Treaty No. 8 area. The judgment of
the Supreme Court of Canada acknowledges the point, but focuses
on the written text of the treaty to conclude that “change” was
indeed contemplated.28 By resting the judgment on the issue of
consultation at the preliminary and planning stage, and avoiding the
question of when a substantive infringement of the treaty right to
hunt occurs, the Court was able to avoid delving deeply into an
arguable large tension between the oral and written versions of the
treaty.

IV. WHEN DOES THE “TAKING UP” OF LAND INTERFERE SO
SIGNIFICANTLY WITH TREATY RIGHTS TO HUNT, FISH AND TRAP
THAT THE SPARROW TEST FOR INFRINGEMENTS IS APPLICABLE?
The central issue before the Supreme Court was whether the proposed
“taking up” of lands was subject to the Sparrow infringement test. Both
sides argued that their interpretation of the Court’s decision in Badger
ought to be determinative.

26
27
28

[1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [hereinafter “Marshall”].
[1999] B.C.J. No. 1880, 1999 BCCA 470 [hereinafter “Halfway River”].
Mikisew v. Canada, supra, note 1, para. 31.
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In considering when exactly a “taking up” would amount to a treaty
infringement, requiring strict justification under the Sparrow test, the
Court starts by identifying a basic principle: not every “taking up” under
Treaty No. 8 will amount to a treaty infringement.
In furtherance of this statement, the Court rejects the holding in
Halfway River that any interference with the right to hunt is a prima
facie infringement which must be justified under the Sparrow test.29
This statement should not be over-read as meaning that a Sparrow
analysis is not applicable in “taking up” cases. The Court suggests quite
the contrary, in the Mikisew v. Canada decision. The Court states that in
cases involving a proposed “taking up” it will first consider the process
by which the “taking up” is planned, before it moves to a Sparrow
analysis.30
After Mikisew v. Canada, a contemplated government action may
be quashed based on either of two grounds: based on a procedural
ground — whether or not the facts would have supported a finding of
infringement of hunting, fishing or trapping rights — or on a substantive
ground, through a Sparrow analysis of the proposed infringement.
What the Court does not do is create a clear picture of when a
Crown measure is sufficiently disruptive as to constitute a substantive
infringement requiring Sparrow justification. It gives some guidance,
when it concludes if a particular Treaty No. 8 First Nation is left with no
“meaningful right to hunt” over its traditional territories, that First
Nation would clearly have a potential action for treaty infringement.31
But what about instances between “adverse impact” (Sparrow threshold
requirement to prove prima facie infringement)32 and “no meaningful
right left”? The Court was equally unclear on whether, in the instant
case, an application of the Sparrow test would have been appropriate if
the Crown had attempted to justify its consultation in Sparrow terms.33

29

Mikisew v. Canada, supra, note 1, para. 32.
Id., para. 59.
31
Id., para. 48.
32
See recent judicial interpretations in R. v. Gladstone, [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2
S.C.R. 723; R. v. Coté, [1996] S.C.J. No. 93, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139.
33
Mikisew v. Canada, supra, note 1, para. 58.
30

(2006), 34 S.C.L.R. (2d)
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V. CONCLUSION
Mikisew v. Canada leaves some unanswered questions that might have
to be addressed in later cases. The Court will have to further refine the
applicability of Sparrow, in cases where there has been a “taking up”
and in other rights contexts. As the duty to accommodate is only
referenced in passing (Crown must attempt to minimize adverse
impacts) there is no clear indication of what level of accommodation
would be necessary based on the facts in the instant case.
In practice, the decision of the Court may encourage federal and
provincial governments to reach more negotiated agreements with First
Nations on contemplated development. By doing so, federal and
provincial governments will avoid the legal risk associated with
proceeding in circumstances where an affected First Nation does not
believe it has been adequately consulted or accommodated. Such
agreements may involve elements such as co-management of
environmental issues and sharing in the revenues produced by economic
development. As in many other cases involving First Nations, the Court
was not so much interested in imposing specific outcomes, either in the
case actually up for adjudication or in future cases, as in establishing a
framework for reconciliation of competing rights and interests through
dialogue and mutual accommodation.

